Fair Ride Allocation on a Line by Amano, Yuki et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
08
04
5v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
6 J
ul 
20
20
Fair Ride Allocation on a Line
Yuki Amano1, Ayumi Igarashi2, Yasushi Kawase3, Kazuhisa Makino1, and Hirotaka Ono4
1 Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. {ukiamano,makino}@kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp
2 National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan. ayumi igarashi@nii.ac.jp
3 Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan. kawase.y.ab@m.titech.ac.jp
4 Nagoya University, Aichi, Japan. ono@nagoya-u.jp
Abstract. With the advent of the ride-sharing platform, the carpooling has become increasingly more
popular and widespread. In this paper, we propose a new model of the fair ride-sharing problem,
where agents with different destinations share rides and divide the total cost among the members of
each group according to the Shapley value. We consider several fairness and stability notions, such
as envy-freeness and Nash stability, and obtain a number of existence and computational complexity
results. Specifically, we show that when the agents’ destinations are aligned on a line graph, a Nash
stable allocation that minimizes the social welfare of agents exists and can be computed efficiently. For
this simple spatial structure, we also obtain parameterized complexity results for finding an envy-free
allocation with respect to various parameters.
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1 Introduction
Imagine a group of university students sharing a ride on a taxi. Each student has a different destination. For
example, Alice may want to directly go back home while Bob prefers to go to the downtown to meet with
his friends. Students may split into multiple groups and benefit from sharing the cost. It is then very natural
to ask how they should form coalitions and divide the cost fairly? This question serves as a fundamental
problem that has been studied over decades in the theory of cooperative games with transferable utilities.
The seminal paper by Shapley [25] offers an elegant solution to the latter problem. The Shapley’s rule
calculates the expectation of each agent’s marginal contribution. It is known to be the unique efficient solution
that satisfies the basic desideratum of ‘equal treatment of equals’ together with several other desirable
properties. Intuitively, if two agents have the exactly same contribution, they will pay the same amount
of money. The axiomatic studies of the Shapley value have resulted in a variety of applications, including
voting [26], network analysis [16], facility location [7], and machine learning [13], to name a few.
While the division by the Shapley value ensures fairness within the same group sharing the cost, it does
not guarantee fairness across different groups. In the preceding example of the ride-sharing, Alice may not
envy Bob who happens to be in the same group; however, she may envy another student who is in a different
group, if she could reduce her cost by swapping among them. Nevertheless, the literature on cooperative
games typically ignores fairness across different coalitions, rather focusing on the fair treatment of individuals
in the same group. Such restrictions on coalition structures have been extensively investigated in the study
of hedonic games, initiated by [5, 9]. However, the main concern is the existence of stable outcomes, i.e.,
coalition structures that are immune to agents’ deviations, in terms of both group and individual deviations.
In this paper, we initiate the study of the fair ride sharing problem. We consider a simple setting where
agents, represented by a point of an interval, would like to go to their own destinations by multiple taxis
with sharing the cost. Although agents start riding at the same point, the destinations of the agents can
vary. The total cost charged to each taxi is determined by the distance between the riding point and the
dropping point where the last agent in the taxi dropped off. The cost of each taxi is assumed to be divided
according to the Shapley value, which is in fact used in a popular fair division website of Spliddit [15]: in
our model, the Shapley value coincides with the payment rule where each agent who still rides a taxi evenly
pays the cost for each interval. We formulate the notions of stability and fairness, including envy-freeness,
Nash stability, and Pareto optimality, and study the existence and complexity of allocations satisfying such
properties. Our central technical contributions are several algorithms for finding fair and stable solutions.
We start by showing that an allocation that simultaneously minimizes the total cost and satisfies several
stability requirements always exists and can be computed efficiently by a simple backward greedy strategy.
This stands in sharp contrast to the standard results of hedonic games in two respects. First, while a stable
outcome does not necessarily exist in the general setting [3], we show that an instance of our problem admits
an outcome that satisfies some stability requirements, such as Nash stability and swap stability. In addition,
we are able to ensure both efficiency and stability of an allocation, which are in general incomparable with
each other except for some restricted classes of games [6, 9].
For envy-freeness, it turns out that such allocation does not necessarily exist. We thus study the problem
of finding an envy-free outcome from a parameterized complexity viewpoint. Specifically, we show that one
can decide the existence of an envy-free allocation in polynomial time when the number of destination types
is small. To this end, we will exploit the structural properties of an envy-free outcome. In essence, the
property of envy-freeness ensures that agents with the same destination can be split into different coalitions
only if they are the first passengers to drop off. Thus, by enumerating all possible ‘shapes’ of an envy-free
outcome, and computing whether there is a size vector of coalitions that makes a given shape envy-free, one
can efficiently decide the existence of an envy-free outcome.
Further, we will show that the problem of computing an envy-free allocation can be solved in polynomial
time when the number of taxis is a constant. The design of the algorithm crucially relies on the fact that
each agent must be assigned to the taxi that charges the minimum cost. This allows us to design a greedy
algorithm to assign an agent to a taxi in an ascending manner. Using a similar technique, we show that
one can compute an envy-free allocation when the maximum capacity of each taxi is at most four. Finally,
we focus on an envy-free allocation that is consecutive with respect to agents’ destinations. This restriction
is important in practical implementation. We show that the consecutive constraint enforces an envy-free
allocation to have a specific structure, which allows one to check envy-freeness only by looking at the envy
between the boundary agents. This enables us to decide the existence of such allocations efficiently. The
omitted proofs and examples are deferred to the appendix.
1.1 Related work
The problem of fairly dividing the cost among multiple agents has been long studied in the context of
cooperative games with transferable utilities; we refer the reader to the book of Chalkiadakis et al. [11]
for an overview. Following the seminal work of Shapley [25], a number of researchers have investigated the
axiomatic property of the Shapely value as well as its applications to real-life problems. Littlechild and
Owen [18] analyzed the property of the Shapley value, when the cost of each subset of agents is given by the
maximum cost associated with the agents in that subset. The work of Chun et al. [12] further studied the
strategic process in which agents divide the cost of the resource, showing that the division by the Shapley
value is indeed a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under a natural three-stage protocol.
There exists a rich body of literature studying fairness and stability in the context of hedonic coalition
formation games and fair division problems [3, 6, 8–10]. In hedonic games, agents have preferences over
coalitions to which they belong, and the goal is to find a partition of agents into disjoint coalitions. Barrot
and Yokoo [6] recently studied the compatibility between fairness and stability requirements, showing that
top responsive games always admit an envy-free, individually stable, and Pareto optimal partition. Further,
our work is similar in spirit to the complexity study of congestion games [19, 22]. In fact, without capacity
constraints, it is not difficult to see that the fair ride-sharing problem can be formulated as a congestion
game. The fairness notions, including envy-freeness in particular, have been well-explored in the fair division
literature. Although much of the focus is on the resource allocation among individuals, several recent papers
study the fair division problem among groups [17, 24]. Our work is different from theirs in that agents’
utilities depend not only on allocated resources, but also on the group structure.
Finally, our work is related to the growing literature on ride-sharing problem [1, 2, 4, 12, 15, 21, 23, 27].
Santi et al. [23] empirically showed a large portion of taxi trips in New York City can be shared while keeping
passengers’ prolonged travel time low. Motivated by an application to the ride-sharing platform, Ashlagi et
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al. [2] considered the problem of matching passengers for sharing rides in an online fashion. They did not,
however, study the fairness perspective of the resulting matching.
2 Model
For a natural number s ∈ N, we write [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. Our setting includes a finite set of agents, denoted
by A = [n], and a finite set of k taxis. The non-empty subsets of agents are referred to as coalitions. Each
agent a ∈ A is endowed with a destination xa ∈ R>0, where R>0 is the set of positive reals. We call each xa
the destination type (or shortly type) of agent a ∈ A.
We assume that the agents ride a taxi at the same initial location and they are sorted in non-decreasing
order of their destinations, i.e., x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn. Each taxi i ∈ [k] has a quota qi representing the capacity
of the taxi where q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qk (> 0). An allocation T = (T1, . . . , Tk) is an ordered k-partition of A,
i.e., (i)
⋃
i∈[k] Ti = A and (ii) Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for any distinct i, j ∈ [k]. By abuse of notation, we write T ∈ T
to denote T ∈ {T1, . . . , Tk}. An allocation T is called feasible if |Ti| ≤ qi for all i ∈ [k]. For each subset T
of agents and s ∈ R>0, we denote by nT (s) the number of agents in T whose destinations xa appear at or
after s, i.e.,
nT (s) :=
∣∣{a ∈ T | xa ≥ s}∣∣.
In addition, we will use notations T<s, T=s, and T>s to denote the set of agents with type smaller than s
(i.e., {a ∈ T | xa < s}), equal to s (i.e., {a ∈ T | xa = s}), and larger than s (i.e., {a ∈ T | xa > s}),
respectively. Also, for a set of types C, we will write T∈C to denote the set of agents of a type in C (i.e.,
{a ∈ T | xa ∈ C}).
In our model, we assume that the cost charged to each taxi Ti is simply the distance of the furthest
destination maxa∈Ti xa, which has to be divided among the agents in Ti. We remark that our results still
hold in a more general scenario where the cost is given by a monotone non-decreasing function of the furthest
destination, i.e., f(maxa∈T xa) with a monotone function f : R>0 → R>0. We can handle the case in our
model by reconfiguring the destination of a as f(xa) because maxa∈T f(xa) = f(maxa∈T xa).
A natural question arises as to how the cost of each taxi should be divided. Among several payment
rules of cooperative games, we consider a scenario where agents divide the cost using the well-known Shapley
value [25], which, in our setting, coincides with the following specific function: for each coalition T ⊆ A and
positive real x ∈ R>0, let
ϕ(T, x) =
∫ x
0
r.
nT (r)
.
For an allocation T and taxi Ti ∈ T , the cost of agent a ∈ Ti is defined as ΦT (a) := ϕi(Ti, xa) where
ϕi(Ti, x) =
{
ϕ(Ti, x) if |Ti| ≤ qi,
∞ if |Ti| > qi.
It is not difficult to verify that the payment rule ϕi satisfies efficiency: the sum of the payments in Ti
equals the total cost if |Ti| ≤ qi, i.e., maxa∈Ti xa =
∑
a′∈Ti
ϕi(Ti, xa′) for any Ti ∈ T with |Ti| ≤ qi. The
following proposition formally states that the payment rule for each taxi coincides with the Shapley value;
the proof is deferred to the appendix. We note that while Littlechild and Owen [18] presented a similar
formulation of the Shapley value for airport games, our model is slightly different from theirs with the
presence of capacity constraints.
Proposition 1. The payment rule ϕi is the Shapley value.
Proof. We write c : 2A → R as a cost function where c(T ) = maxa∈T xa for each T ⊆ A with T 6= ∅, and
c(T ) = 0 for T = ∅. Take any T ⊆ A and a ∈ T . Let T = {a1, . . . , at} such that xa1 ≤ xa2 ≤ · · · ≤ xat , and
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let a = ai. We denote by Π the set of permutations π : T → [t]; we write Sπ(a) = { a′ ∈ T | π(a′) ≤ π(a) }
for each π ∈ Π . Recall that according to the Shapley value, the amount agent a has to pay in the game
(T, c) is given by:
1
t!
∑
π∈Π
(c(Sπ(a))− c(Sπ(a)− a)).
Letting xa0 = 0, we have
∑
π∈Π
(c(Sπ(a))− c(Sπ(a)− a) =
∑
π∈Π
i∑
j=1
(xaj − xaj−1)1Sπ(a)∩{aj ,...,at}={a}
=
i∑
j=1
(xaj − xaj−1 )
∑
π∈Π
1Sπ(a)∩{aj ,...,at}={a}
=
i∑
j=1
(xaj − xaj−1 )
t!
t− j + 1
,
where the third equality holds because 1Sπ(a)∩{aj,...,at}={a} takes value 1 if and only if agent ai appears first
at π among agents aj , aj+1, . . . , at. Thus,
1
t!
∑
π∈Π
(c(Sπ(a))− c(Sπ(a)− a) =
i∑
j=1
xaj − xaj−1
t− j + 1
=
∫ xa
0
r.
nT (r)
= ϕ(T, a).
To illustrate our payment rule, consider the following example. We will use a succinct notation to specify
examples. An instance will be denoted as a single arrow where the black circles on each arrow will denote
the set of agents who drop off at the same destination. The labels above and below the circles represent the
agents and the destinations, respectively. An allocation will be written as a sequence of arrows.
T1
T2
a1
12
b1
24
c1
36
d1
40
a2
12
b2
24
c2
36
d2
40
Fig. 1. The allocation T in Example 2
T1
T2
a1, a2
12
b1, b2
24
c1, c2
36
d1, d2
40
Fig. 2. The allocation T ′ in Example 2
Example 1. Suppose that agents a, b, c, and d ride on one taxi together from a starting point and drop off
respectively at points of 12, 24, 36, and 40 on a line. The total cost is 40, which corresponds to the drop-off
point of d. According to the Shapley value, each of agents a, b, c, and d pays 3, 7, 13, and 17, respectively.
In fact, from the starting point to a’s drop-off point, there are four agents riding the taxi, so they equally
divide the cost of 12, which means that a should pay 3. Then, from a’s dropping point to b’s dropping point,
there are three agents riding the taxi, so they equally divide the cost of 24 − 12 = 12, which results in the
cost of 4 for each of the three agents. Thus agent b pays 3 + 4 = 7. By repeating similar arguments, c pays
7 + (36− 24)/2 = 13, and d pays 13 + (40− 36) = 17.
Example 2. Suppose that there are 8 agents, say ai, bi, ci, and di, i = 1, 2, and two taxis T1 and T2 with
quota qi = 4 for each i = 1, 2. Agents ai, bi, ci, and di (i = 1, 2) drop off at the corresponding points of a,
b, c and d, respectively. Consider an allocation T that ai, bi, ci and di ride on Ti for i = 1, 2. See Fig. 1.
The cost of each taxi is 40, which should be divided by the Shapley value as explained above. However, this
allocation is not reasonable from several points of view. First, the total cost of the agents is 40 + 40 = 80,
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but another allocation T ′ of T ′1 = {a1, a2, b1, b2} and T
′
2 = {c1, c2, d1, d2} costs 24+ 40 = 64 only; see Fig. 2.
Furthermore, there is an envy between agents. For example, d1 envies c2, because if d1 were to replace with
c2, i.e., T2 − c2 + d1 = {a2, b2, d1, d2}, agent d1 needs to pay 3 + 4+ (40− 24)/2 = 15 only, which is cheaper
than the current cost of 17.
3 Solution concepts
Agents split into coalitions and use the Shapley value to divide the final cost. Our goal is to find a partitioning
of agents that satisfies several natural desiderata. Below, we introduce fairness, stability, and efficiency criteria
that are inspired from coalition formation games and resource allocation problems [3, 9, 10, 14].
Fairness: Envy-freeness is one of the most studied fairness concepts in resource allocation, which requires
that no agent prefers another agent’s coalition over his own. Formally, for an allocation T , agent ai ∈ Ti envies
aj ∈ Tj if ai can be made strictly better off by replacing aj with himself, i.e., ϕi(Tj−aj+ai, xai) < ϕi(Ti, xai).
A feasible allocation T is envy-free (EF) if no agent envies the others. Without capacity constraints, i.e.,
q1 ≥ n, envy-freeness can be trivially achieved, for example, by partitioning the agents into the grand
coalition. Also, when the number of taxis is at least the number of agents, i.e., k ≥ n, an outcome that
partitions the agents into the singletons is envy-free.
Stability: We adapt the following four definitions of stability concepts of hedonic games [3, 8, 9] to our
setting. The first stability concepts we introduce are those that are immune to individual deviations. For an
allocation T and taxis i, j ∈ [k], agent a ∈ Ti has a Nash-deviation to Tj if ϕj(Tj + a, xa) < ϕi(Ti, xa). Note
that by the definition of the function ϕj , agent a does not have a Nash-deviation to Tj if adding a to Tj
violates the capacity constraint, i.e., |Tj | ≥ qj . We say that a feasible allocation T is
– Nash stable (NS) if no agent has a Nash deviation;
– contractually individually stable (CIS) if for each Ti ∈ T and a ∈ Ti, agent a does not have a Nash
deviation or the cost of some agent a′ ∈ Ti increases if a leaves Ti, i.e., ϕi(Ti − a, xa′) > ϕi(Ti, xa′).
In our model, the definition of CIS only requires that no agent a in a singleton coalition has a Nash deviation
since a deviation of an agent necessarily increases the costs of the other agents in his coalition.
We will also consider stability notions that capture resistance to swap deviations. For an allocation T and
i, j ∈ [k], agent ai ∈ Ti can replace aj ∈ Tj if ϕj(Tj − aj + ai, xai) ≤ ϕi(Ti, xai) [6, 20]. A feasible allocation
T is
– weakly swap-stable (WSS) if there is no pair of agents ai ∈ Ti and aj ∈ Tj (i 6= j) such that ai and aj
envy each other;
– strongly swap-stable (SSS) if there is no pair of agents ai ∈ Ti and aj ∈ Tj (i 6= j) such that ai envies
aj , and aj can replace ai.
Efficiency: Besides fairness and stability, another important property of allocation is efficiency. For two
feasible allocations T ′ and T , we say that T ′ strictly Pareto dominates T if ΦT (a) > ΦT ′(a) for all a ∈ A;
T ′ weakly Pareto dominates T if ΦT (a) ≥ ΦT ′(a) for all a ∈ A with ΦT (a) > ΦT ′(a) for at least one a ∈ A.
A feasible allocation T is weakly Pareto optimal (WPO) if there is no feasible allocation T ′ that strictly
Pareto dominates T ; it is strongly Pareto optimal (SPO) if there is no feasible allocation T ′ that weakly
Pareto dominates T . The total cost of an allocation T is defined as
∑
T∈T
∑
a∈T ϕ(T, xa). Note that the total
cost of a feasible allocation T is equal to
∑
T∈T :T 6=∅maxa∈T xa. A feasible allocation T is social optimum
(SO) if it minimizes the total cost over all feasible allocations.
In our game, we have the following containment relations among these classes of outcomes:
EF ( SSS ( WSS, SO ( SPO ( WPO ( CIS, and NS ( CIS. (1)
Here, EF is defined to be the set of envy-free feasible allocations, and the other symbols are defined analo-
gously. It is not difficult to see that the relationships with equality hold by the definitions of the concepts.
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To show proper inclusion, we give some examples in the appendix. Moreover, any two concepts that do not
have containment relationships in (1) are incomparable; see examples in the appendix.
Fig. 3 describes the implication relationships among the solution concepts defined in Section 3. We will
show below that any two concepts that do not have containment relationships in Fig. 3 are incompara-
ble. Namely, there are examples that are (i) SO and NS but not WSS (Example 3), (ii) EF but not CIS
(Example 4), (iii) NS and EF but not WPO (Example 5), and (iv) SO and EF but not NS (Example 6),
respectively. In addition, we will show that the relationship of any two concepts that are directly connect in
3 is proper inclusion by providing the following examples: (a) SSS but not EF (Example 8), (b) WSS but
not SSS (Example 7), (c) SPO but not SO (Example 8), (d) WPO but not SPO (Example 7), (e) CIS but
not WPO (Example 5), (f) CIS but not NS (Example 6).
Proposition 2. The concepts of allocations satisfies the inclusion relationships shown in Fig. 3.
EF
SSS
WSS
SO
SPO
WPO
CIS
NS
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 3. Inclusion relationships among the concepts. Any two concepts without any path between them are incompa-
rable.
Example 3. Consider an instance where n = 9, k = 2, q1 = 5, q2 = 4, and x1 = 1, x2 = x3 = 2, x4 =
· · · = x9 = 4. An allocation T = ({2, 3, 7, 8, 9}, {1, 4, 5, 6}) (see Fig. 4) is socially optimal and Nash stable.
However, agents 1 and 9 envy each other, which implies that T is not WSS.
Example 4. Consider an instance where n = 2, k = 2, q1 = q2 = 2, and x1 = x2 = 1. Then, an allocation
T = ({1}, {2}) is envy-free but not contractually individually stable.
Example 5. Consider an instance where n = 4, k = 3, q1 = q2 = 2, q3 = 4, and x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 = 1.
Then, an allocation T = ({1, 2}, {3, 4}, ∅) is Nash stable and envy-free. However, another feasible allocation
T ′ = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, ∅, ∅) strictly Pareto dominates T , and hence T is not weakly Pareto optimal.
Example 6. Consider an instance where n = 5, k = 2, q1 = q2 = 3, x1 = 1, and x2 = x3 = x4 = x5 = 2.
Then, an allocation T = ({1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}) (see Fig. 5) is socially optimum. However, agents 2 and 3 have a
Nash deviation to T2, and thus T is not Nash stable.
Example 7. Consider an instance where n = 4, k = 2, q1 = q2 = 2, x1 = x2 = 1, and x3 = x4 = 2. Then, an
allocation T = ({1, 3}, {2, 4}) (see Fig. 6) is weakly swap-stable but not strongly swap-stable. Moreover, T
is weakly Pareto optimal but not strongly Pareto optimal.
Example 8. Consider an instance where n = 3, k = 2, q1 = 2, q2 = 1, x1 = 1, and x2 = x3 = 2. Then, an
allocation T = ({1, 2}, {3}) (see Fig. 7) is strongly Pareto optimal but not socially optimum. In addition, T
is strongly swap-stable but not envy-free (since agent 3 envies 1).
6
T1
T2
1
1
2,3
2
4,5,6
4
7,8,9
4
Fig. 4. An allocation that is SO and NS but not WSS
T1
T2
1
1
2,3
2
4,5
2
Fig. 5. An allocation that is SO and EF but not NS]
T1
T2
1
1
2
1
3
2
4
2
Fig. 6. An allocation that is WSS but not SSS
T1
T2
1
1
2
2
3
2
Fig. 7. An allocation that is SPO and SSS but neither
SO nor EF
4 Stable and socially optimal allocations
In this section, we will show that an allocation that greedily groups agents with furthest destinations together
satisfies Nash stability, strongly swap-stability, and social optimality. Specifically, we will design the following
‘backward greedy’ allocation: We greedily add an agent with the furthest destination to the current coalition
Ti as long as Ti has size strictly less than the maximum size qi of available taxis. If Ti becomes saturated,
then we proceed to create a new coalition of size qi+1. The formal description is shown in Algorithm 1, which
runs in O(n + k) time. Here, recall that the agents are sorted in non-decreasing order of their destinations
and the taxis are sorted in non-increasing order of their capacities.
Algorithm 1: Backward greedy
1 Initialize Ti ← ∅ for each i ∈ [k] and let k
′ ← 1;
2 for a← n to 1 do
3 if |Tk′ | = qk′ then
4 k′ ← k′ + 1;
5 if k′ > k then return “No feasible allocation”;
6 Set Tk′ ← Tk′ + a;
7 return (T1, T2, . . . , Tk);
Theorem 1. If there is a feasible outcome, the backward greedy (Algorithm 1) returns a feasible allocation
that is socially optimal, Nash stable, and strongly swap stable in polynomial time.
Proof. It is not difficult to see that Algorithm 1 returns a feasible allocation if there exists such an allocation.
In what follows, suppose that the algorithm returns a feasible allocation T = (T1, T2, . . . , Tk).
First, we show that the allocation T satisfies the Nash stability. Let k′ be the index at the end of
Algorithm 1, i.e., Tk′ is the last coalition that was made. Note that agents can have a deviation to the
coalition Tk′ only, as the other groups T1, T2, . . . , Tk′−1 do not have an empty seat and a deviation to an
empty taxi j (> k′) is not profitable. Further, if agent a ∈ Ti can deviate to Tk′ , agent a would become the
last passenger to drop off but |Tk′ |+ 1 ≤ qk′ ≤ qi = |Ti|, which implies
ϕ(Tk′ + a, xa)− ϕ(Ti, xa) ≥ ϕ(Tk′ + a, xb) + (xa − xb)− ϕ(Ti, xb)− (xa − xb),
= ϕ(Tk′ + a, xb)− ϕ(Ti, xb) ≥
xb
|Tk′ |+ 1
−
xb
|Ti|
> 0,
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where xb = maxb′∈Tk′ xb′ , yielding a contradiction. Thus T is Nash stable.
Next, we show that T is strongly swap-stable. Since swapping a pair of agents in the same taxi has no
effect on the cost, it suffices to show that there is no beneficial swap of agents who belong to different taxis.
That is, we will show that for any pair of agents ai and aj with ai ∈ Ti and aj ∈ Tj (i < j), if agent ai can
replace aj , i.e., ϕ(Tj − aj + ai, xai) ≤ ϕ(Ti, xai), then swapping ai and aj does not change the cost for each
of the agents, i.e.,
– ϕ(Tj − aj + ai, xai) = ϕ(Ti, xai); and
– ϕ(Ti − ai + aj , xaj ) = ϕ(Tj , xaj ).
To see this, take any pair of agents ai ∈ Ti and aj ∈ Tj (i < j) and suppose that ϕ(Tj − aj + ai, xai) ≤
ϕ(Ti, xai). Observe first that by construction of T , |Ti| ≥ |Tj | and xai ≥ xa for all a ∈ Tj . Thus, for all
s ∈ R≥0,
nTj−aj+ai(s) ≤ nTi(s)
meaning the number of agents who ride the ith taxi at s is greater or equal to the number of agents who
ride the jth taxi at s after ai swaps with aj . On the other hand, our supposition implies:∫ xai
0
r.
nTj−aj+ai(r)
= ϕ(Tj − aj + ai, xai) ≤ ϕ(Ti, xai) =
∫ xai
0
r.
nTi(r)
.
Hence, we have nTj−aj+ai(s) = nTi(s) for all s ∈ [0, xai ], which implies |Ti| = |Tj| and xa = xai for all
a ∈ Tj . Thus, we have
ϕ(Tj − aj + ai, xai) =
∫ xai
0
r.
nTj−aj+ai(r)
=
∫ xai
0
r.
nTi(r)
= ϕ(Ti, xai)
and
ϕ(Ti − ai + aj, xaj ) =
∫ xaj
0
r.
nTi−ai+aj (r)
=
∫ xaj
0
r.
nTj (r)
= ϕ(Tj , xaj ),
which proves the claim.
It remains to show that T is socially optimal, i.e., T minimizes the total cost. Recall that the total cost of a
feasible allocation is simply the sum of the furthest destinations in each taxi
∑k′
i=1 yi, where yi = maxa∈Ti xa
for each i ∈ [k′]. We will show that the sequence of the last drop-off locations in the socially optimal outcomes
must be unique and identical to that of the backward greedy allocation, which implies that T is socially
optimal as well. Consider any feasible allocation T ′ that is socially optimal. Let y′1, y
′
2, . . . , y
′
ℓ denote the
furthest destinations among agents of each coalition T ′ ∈ T ′ with T ′ 6= ∅ aligned in non-increasing order,
i.e., y′1 ≥ y
′
2 ≥ · · · ≥ y
′
ℓ. Clearly, y
′
1 = y1. Also, by construction of T , it can be easily verified that ℓ ≥ k
′.
We will show that y′j ≥ yj for j = 1, . . . , k
′. Suppose otherwise and take minimum such j > 1 violating the
inequality: y′j < yj . This means that all agents a whose destinations xa appear after y
′
j (i.e., xa > y
′
j) are
put into j − 1 coalitions under T ′. We obtain
j−1∑
i=1
qi =
j−1∑
i=1
|Ti| <
∣∣{ a ∈ A | xa > y′j }∣∣ ≤
j−1∑
i=1
qi,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that yj > y
′
j , but jth furthest drop-off location is yj under
T . This yields a desired contradiction.
An obvious corollary of the above theorem is that an outcome that satisfies all the fairness, stability, and
efficiency notions defined in Section 3, except for envy-freeness, exists whenever a feasible allocation exists.
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5 Envy-free allocations
We have seen that Nash stability as well as Pareto optimality are possible to achieve simultaneously. In
contrast, the set of envy-free feasible allocations may be empty even when a feasible outcome exists, as
shown in the following example.
Example 9. Consider an instance where n = 4, k = 2, q1 = q2 = 2, x1 = 2, and x2 = x3 = x4 = 4. We will
show that no feasible allocation is envy-free. To see this, let T = (T1, T2) be an envy-free feasible allocation.
By feasibility, the capacity of each taxi must be full, i.e., |T1| = |T2| = 2. Suppose without loss of generality
that T1 = {1, 2}. Then, T2 = {3, 4} (see Fig. 8). Thus, agent 2 envies the agents of the same type. Indeed,
he needs to pay the cost of 3 at the current coalition while he would only pay 2 if he were to replace 3 (or
4) with himself. Hence, no feasible allocation is envy-free.
T1
T2
1
2
2
4
3,4
4
Fig. 8. An instance without any envy-free allocation
Given that an envy-free outcome may not exist, we turn our attention to the problem of deciding the
existence of an envy-free feasible allocation and finding one if it exists. We first present the parameterized
complexity results with respect to various parameters. We then study the complexity of finding consecutive
envy-free allocations where each group of agents is consecutive with respect to their destinations.
5.1 Parameterized setting
A natural approach is to explore the complexity of our problem from the perspective of fixed parameter
tractability. A problem is said to be fixed parameter tractable (FPT) with respect to a parameter p if each
instance I of this problem can be solved in time f(p) · poly(|I|), and to be slice-wise polynomial (XP) with
respect to p if each instance I of this problem can be solved in time f(p) · |I|g(p); here f(·) and g(·) are
computable functions that depend on p only, and poly(·) is an arbitrary polynomial.
In our setting, a particularly relevant parameter is the number of destinations: generally, we expect the
number of destinations to be small in many practical applications. For instance, a workshop organizer may
offer a few excursion opportunities to the participants of the workshop. The number of students using a
school bus of the same route may be limited. The other parameters we consider include the number of taxis
and the maximum capacity of a taxi. These restrictions are also relevant in many real-life scenarios: for
example, a taxi company may have a limited resource, both in terms of quantity and capacity.
In what follows, we will design efficient algorithms to compute an envy-free feasible allocation when each
of the above parameters is small. We first present an FPT algorithm to compute an envy-free allocation with
respect to the number of types. Further, we show that obtaining an envy-free allocation is polynomial time
solvable when the number of taxis is constant, or the maximum capacity of a taxi is at most four.
Before we proceed, we present a few auxiliary lemmas that will play a key role in designing such algorithms.
One important property of an envy-free allocation is the monotonicity of the size of coalitions in terms of
the first drop-off point, which is formalized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 (Monotonicity lemma). For any envy-free allocation T and non-empty coalitions T, T ′ ∈ T ,
we have the following:
min
a∈T
xa ≤ min
a′∈T ′
xa′ implies |T | ≥ |T
′|, (2)
min
a∈T
xa = min
a′∈T ′
xa′ implies |T | = |T
′|. (3)
Proof. To prove (2) by contradiction, suppose that mina∈T xa ≤ mina′∈T ′ xa′ and |T | < |T ′|. Let a∗ ∈
argmina∈T xa. Then, a
∗ envies any a′ ∈ T ′ because
ϕ(T, xa∗) =
xa∗
|T |
>
xa∗
|T ′|
= ϕ(T ′ − a′ + a∗, xa∗).
In addition, (3) holds by (2).
Agents of type x are called split in an allocation T if there exist distinct T, T ′ ∈ T such that T=x 6= ∅
and T ′=x 6= ∅. The next lemma states that, the agents of type x can be split in an envy-free allocation only if
they are the first passengers to drop off in their coalitions, and such coalitions are of the same size; further,
if two taxis have an equal number of agents of split type, then no agent of the other type ride these taxis.
Lemma 2 (Split lemma). For an envy-free allocation T and a type x, suppose that there exist distinct
T, T ′ ∈ T such that T=x 6= ∅ and T ′=x 6= ∅.Then, the following hold:
(i) The agents of type x are the first passengers to drop off in both T and T ′, i.e., T<x = T
′
<x = ∅,
(ii) Both T and T ′ are of the same size, i.e., |T | = |T ′|, and
(iii) If |T=x| = |T ′=x|, then T = T=x and T
′ = T ′=x.
Proof. Let a ∈ T=x and b ∈ T ′=x. As a and b do not envy each other, we have
ϕ(T, x) = ϕ(T, xa) ≤ ϕ(T
′ − b+ a, xa) = ϕ(T
′, x),
ϕ(T ′, x) = ϕ(T ′, xb) ≤ ϕ(T − a+ b, xb) = ϕ(T, x).
Hence, ϕ(T, x) = ϕ(T ′, x).
To show (i), suppose to the contrary that T<x is non-empty and let aˆ be its element. Then, b envies aˆ
because
ϕ(T ′, xb) = ϕ(T, x) > ϕ(T − aˆ+ b, x).
Hence, T<x = ∅. By symmetry, we also have T ′<x = ∅, proving (i). This implies that ϕ(T, x) = x/|T | and
ϕ(T ′, x) = x/|T ′|. Since ϕ(T, x) = ϕ(T ′, x), we have |T | = |T ′|, which proves (ii).
To see (iii), suppose towards a contradiction that |T=x| = |T ′=x| but there is an agent in T or T
′ whose
destination appears strictly after x, i.e., (T ∪ T ′) \ A=x 6= ∅. Let a∗ be the agent with closest destination
among such agents, i.e., a∗ ∈ argmina′∈(T∪T ′)\A=x xa′ . Assume without loss of generality a
∗ ∈ T . Then, a∗
envies b because
ϕ(T ′ − b+ a∗, xa∗) =
x
|T ′|
+
(xa∗ − x)
|T ′| − |T ′=x|+ 1
<
x
|T |
+
(xa∗ − x)
|T | − |T=x|
= ϕ(T, xa∗),
yielding a contradiction. Hence, |T=x| = |T ′=x| implies T = T=x and T
′ = T ′=x.
Small number of types The goal of this subsection is to show that we can find an envy-free feasible
allocation in FPT time with respect to the number of destination types. Due to the split lemma, once we
know the first drop-off points of each coalition, no agent of the other type will be split in an envy-free
allocation. Thus, the ‘shapes’ of an envy-free allocation representing the agent types of each taxi have a
particular structure where the first drop-off points can be considered as roots, followed by the agents of the
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other type. The main idea of the following algorithm is to enumerate all such structures and decide whether
each agent can be assigned to each taxi in an envy-free manner that is consistent with the given shape.
Throughout, we assume that there are p types of agents, i.e., p =
∣∣{xa | a ∈ A}∣∣. Let {y1, y2, . . . , yp} be
the set of destination types, namely, {y1, y2, . . . , yp} = {xa | a ∈ A} where y1 < y2 < · · · < yp. We call a
directed graph over the set of types star-forest if it is a directed out-forest in which every non-root node has
out-degree at most one and every edge is oriented from a smaller type to a larger type. We write T ≃ T ′ to
denote that T and T ′ contains the same number of agents for any type, i.e., |T=y| = |T ′=y| for all y ∈ V .
Enumerating allocation graphs. We will first define the notion of an allocation graph. For a feasible
allocation T = (T1, . . . , Tk), the allocation graph of T is a directed graph GT = (V,E) over the set of types
where there is an edge from yi to yj if and only if an agent of type yj drops off just after an agent of type
yi in some coalition T ∈ T , i.e.,
V = {y1, y2, . . . , yp},
E =
⋃
T∈T
{
(yi, yj) ∈ V
2
∣∣∣∣ yi, yj ∈ {xa | a ∈ T }, yi < yj,yi < xa < yj (6 ∃a ∈ T )
}
.
Note that the allocation graph is always acyclic because every edge is oriented from a smaller type to a larger
type. Now let us consider the allocation graph of an envy-free feasible allocation T . Recall that by the split
lemma (Lemma 2), the agents who are not the first passengers to drop off are not split in T , implying that all
such agents are assigned to the same taxi. Hence, the in-degree of such type must be one and the out-degree
is at most one in GT . This readily implies that GT is a star-forest with roots being the first passengers to
drop off in each taxi.
Lemma 3. If T is an envy-free feasible allocation, then GT is star-forest.
An example of the allocation graph for an envy-free feasible allocation is depicted in Fig. 9. Here, a non-
empty path from a root to a leaf corresponds to the corresponding taxi. We note that agents of root type
may also form their own coalitions (e.g. T4 in the example of Fig. 9). In addition, any singleton corresponds
to a set of taxis that carry the agents of one type only.
r1
r1
1
, . . . , r7
1
a1
1
, . . . , a5
1
b1
1
, b2
1
b1
2
, b2
2
c1 c2
r2
r1
2
, . . . , r7
2 d1 d2 d3
r3
r1
3
, . . . , r10
3
r4
r1
4
, r2
4
, r3
4
e1
1
, e2
1
, e3
1
f1 f2
Fig. 9. An example of the allocation graph for an envy-free feasible allocation T = (T1, T2, . . . , T9) where
T1 = {r
1
1 , a
1
1, a
2
1, a
3
1, a
4
1, a
5
1}, T2 = {r
2
1, r
3
1, b
1
1, b
2
1, b
1
2, b
2
2}, T3 = {r
4
1 , r
5
1, r
6
1, r
7
1, c1, c2}, T4 = {r
1
2 , r
2
2, r
3
2 , r
4
2, r
5
2}, T5 =
{r62 , r
7
2, d1, d2, d3}, T6 = {r
1
3 , r
2
3, r
3
3, r
4
3, r
5
3}, T7 = {r
6
3 , r
7
3 , r
8
3, r
9
3 , r
10
3 }, T8 = {r
1
4 , e
1
1, e
2
1, e
3
1}, T9 = {r
2
4 , r
3
4 , f1, f2}. There
are seven agents of type r1 (r
1
1, . . . , r
7
1), seven agents of type r2 (r
1
2, . . . , r
7
2), ten agents of type r3 (r
1
3, . . . , r
10
3 ), and
three agents of type r4 (r
1
4, r
2
4 , r
3
4).
The number of star-forest graphs is at most pp because the in-degree of every node is at most one. Hence,
we can enumerate all the possible allocation graphs that could be induced by an envy-free feasible allocation
in FPT time.
Computing size vectors. Next, we consider whether given a star-forest graph, there is an envy-free allo-
cation that is consistent with the graph. Formally, an allocation T is consistent with a star-forest graph G
if G = GT . In order to find such allocation that is envy-free, one naive approach is to treat each path of the
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trees starting with a root independently, and guess the possible size of the respective coalitions. However,
due to the split lemma, we know that all the taxis that involves the same split type have the same size in an
envy-free allocation. Thus, it suffices to assume that the number of agents assigned to each path is the same
within each of the connected components, and guess the size λj of a coalition with the first drop-off point
being the root of each rooted tree Cj . We may then try the brute-force approach to enumerate all possible
such vectors, which gives rise to an O(np) algorithm. It turns out that there is a more sophisticated way
to reduce this upper bound to O(n4) by iteratively updating the component-wise maximum size vector; the
underlying lattice structure of size vectors will play a key role in designing the algorithm.
Now, fix a star-forest graph G and let us consider an envy-free feasible allocation T that is consistent
with G. We will closely look at the properties of λj in an envy-free feasible allocation. Specifically, let
C = {C1, . . . , Ct} be the set of the vertex sets of the trees of G, and let rj = minCj be the root for each
Cj ∈ C. We assume that the roots are arranged in ascending order, i.e., r1 < · · · < rt. For each j ∈ [t], we
let λTj be the size of T ∈ T that consists of agents of a type in Cj (i.e., T ⊆ A∈Cj ). Such a size can be
uniquely determined by the split lemma (Lemma 2) because the first drop-off point of T must be rj and all
such coalitions have the same size. For instance, λT1 = 6, λ
T
2 = λ
T
3 = 5, and λ
T
4 = 4 in the example of Fig. 9.
We call λT = (λTj )j∈[t] a size vector induced by T . In the graph G, the types in Cj − rj are partitioned into
paths by the structure of the star-forest graph. Let C1j , . . . , C
hj
j be the vertex sets of the paths. The size
vector induced by an envy-free allocation satisfies the following conditions that are efficiently verifiable.
Lemma 4. The size vector λT induced by an envy-free feasible allocation T satisfies the following conditions:
λTj is a divisor of |A∈Cj | (∀j ∈ [t]), (4)
|A∈Cj | ≥ λ
T
j · hj (∀j ∈ [t]), (5)
λTj > maxℓ∈[hj ] |A∈Cℓj | (∀j ∈ [t]), (6)∑
j∈[t] |A∈Cj |/λ
T
j ≤ k, and (7)
λT1 ≥ λ
T
2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ
T
t . (8)
Proof. As the agents of a type in Cj form at least hj coalitions, each of which consists of λ
T
j agents, (4)
and (5) are satisfied. Also, as every coalition corresponding to Cℓj contains at least one agent of type rj , (6)
is satisfied. In addition, (7) holds because the agents of a type in Cj form |A∈Cj |/λj coalitions. Finally, (8)
holds by Lemma 1.
Observe, on the other hand, that fixing an allocation graph and a size vector gives rise to an allocation.
Formally, we call a vector λ ∈ [n]t a valid size vector with respect to G if it satisfies the conditions (4)–(8)
in Lemma 4, and an invalid size vector with respect to G otherwise. For a valid size vector λ, we define T λ
to be an allocation that induces λ. That is, T λ is an allocation such that the cardinality of Tλi is λj , and
– Tλi consists of all the agents of a type in C
η
j and some agents of type rj (i.e., A∈Cηj ⊆ T
λ
i ⊆ A∈Cηj ∪A=rj
and |Tλi ∩A=rj | = λj − |A∈Cηj |) if η ∈ [hj ];
– Tλi consists of some agents of type rj (i.e., T
λ
i ⊆ A=rj and |T
λ
i | = |T
λ
i ∩ A=rj | = λj) if η 6∈ [hj ],
for i =
∑j−1
j′=1 |A∈Cj′ |/λj′+η with j ∈ [t] and η ∈
[
|A∈Cj |/λj
]
. We note that T λ is unique up to isomorphism.
More precisely, if there are two allocations T and T ′ that induces λ, then there exists a permutation
σ : [k]→ [k] such that Ti ≃ T ′σ(i) for all i ∈ [k].
Now let Λ∗ be the set of vectors λ ∈ [n]t that are induced by envy-free feasible allocations T consistent
with G. Note that any λ ∈ Λ∗ is a valid size vector by Lemma 4. The next lemma states that we can restore
an envy-free feasible allocation from any size vector in Λ∗.
Lemma 5. For any λ ∈ Λ∗, the allocation T λ is an envy-free feasible allocation.
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Proof. Let T be an envy-free feasible allocation that induces λ. Then, by the definition of T λ, there exists
a one-to-one correspondence σ : [k]→ [k] such that Tλi ≃ Tσ(i) for all i ∈ [k]. Recall that the taxis are sorted
in non-increasing order of their capacities. As |Tλ1 | ≥ |T
λ
2 | ≥ · · · ≥ |T
λ
k | by the construction of T
λ and (8),
the allocation T λ is feasible. Hence, T λ is an envy-free feasible allocation.
Our problem reduces to deciding whether Λ∗ is empty or not. Let Λj be a set of candidate sizes λj for
each j ∈ [t] and suppose that Λ∗ ⊆
∏
j∈[t] Λj. Here, by (4), Λj =
[
|A∈Cj |
]
can be used as an initial set of
candidate sizes.
Lemma 6. If Λj =
[
|A∈Cj |
]
for all j ∈ [t], then Λ∗ ⊆
∏
j∈[t] Λj.
Then, we show that (maxΛj)j∈[t] ∈ Λ
∗ or efficiently remove a candidate vector. The following lemma is
a slightly stronger version of this statement.
Lemma 7. Suppose that Λj 6= ∅ (∀j ∈ [t]) and let λ = (maxΛj)j∈[t]. If λ 6∈ Λ
∗, then there exists an index
j∗ ∈ [t] such that
Λ∗ ∩
∏
j∈[t]
Λ′j = Λ
∗ ∩
∏
j∈[t]
Λj where Λ
′
j =
{
Λj − λj if j = j∗,
Λj if j 6= j∗.
(9)
In addition, such a j∗ can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. First, suppose that λ is invalid. If it violates (4) or (5) for an index j′ ∈ [t], then λ∗j′ 6= λj′ for any
valid size vector λ∗ ∈
∏
j∈[t] Λj . If it violates (6) or (7), then Λ
∗ = ∅ because any size vector in
∏
j∈[t] Λj is
invalid. If it violates (8), let j′ be an index such that λj′−1 < λj′ . Then, λ
∗
j′ 6= λj′ for any valid size vector
λ
∗ ∈
∏
j∈[t] Λj since λ
∗
j′ ≤ λ
∗
j′−1 ≤ λj′−1. Hence, in either case, we can efficiently find j
∗ that satisfies (9)
if λ is invalid. From now on, suppose that λ is valid. Note that, as λ 6∈ Λ∗, the allocation T λ is not an
envy-free feasible allocation.
Suppose that T λ is infeasible. Let i′ be the minimum index that satisfies |Tλi′ | > qi′ and let j
′ ∈ [t] be
the index such that Tλi′ ⊆ A∈Cj′ . Since λ is the size vector that selects the possible largest size for each
j ∈ [t] and the number of taxis that are used by the agents of a type Cj is inversely proportional to λj , some
agents of a type in Cj′ must be allocated to a taxi with index at least i
′. Hence, T λ
′
is also infeasible for
any λ′ ∈
∏
j∈[t] Λj with λ
′
j′ = λj′ . Thus, j
∗ = j′ satisfies (9).
Now, we assume that T λ is feasible but not envy-free. Suppose that agent a ∈ Tλi envies another agent
a′ ∈ Tλi′ , and let j and j
′ ∈ [t] denote, respectively, the indices such that Tλi ⊆ A∈Cj and T
λ
i′ ⊆ A∈Cj′ . If
j = j′, the allocation T λ
′
is not envy-free for any λ′ ∈
∏
j∈[t] Λj with λ
′
j = λj because the agents of a type in
Cj are partitioned into coalitions in the same way in T λ and T λ
′
(i.e., there exists η such that Tλi ≃ T
λ
′
i+η for
any i with Tλi ⊆ A∈Cj). Thus, suppose j 6= j
′. Consider the allocation T λ
′
for a size vector λ′ ∈
∏
j
′′∈[t] Λj′′
with λ′j′ = λj′ . We will show that j
∗ = j′ satisfies (9). As λ′j ≤ λj , the cost of a for T
λ
′
is at least that for
T λ (i.e., ΦT λ′ (a) ≥ ΦT λ(a)). Moreover, as λ
′
j′ = λj′ , there exist an agent a
† and a coalition Tλ
′
i†
such that
a† ∈ Tλ
′
i†
, xa† = xa′ , and T
λ
i′ ≃ T
λ
′
i†
. Then the cost of a after swapping a with a′ in T λ is equal to the cost
of a after swapping a with a† in T λ
′
(i.e., ϕ(T λi′ − a
′ + a, xa) = ϕ(T λ
′
i†
− a† + a, xa)). Hence, we have
ΦT λ′ (a) ≥ ΦT λ(a) = ϕ(T
λ
i′ , xa) > ϕ(T
λ
i′ − a
′ + a, xa) = ϕ(T
λ
′
i† − a
† + a, xa),
which means that a envies a† in T λ
′
. Thus, j∗ = j′ satisfies (9).
Remark 1. Lemma 7 implies that any non-empty Λ∗∗ ⊆ Λ∗ has a least upper bound. Hence, Λ∗ is an upper
semilattice with respect to the componentwise max operation.
By Lemma 7, we can obtain an envy-free feasible allocation by iteratively eliminating a candidate vector.
Formally, we can check the existence of an envy-free feasible allocation by Algorithm 2. The running time
of the algorithm is O(pp · n4), which is FPT. Hence, we obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 2. We can check the existence of an envy-free feasible allocation, and find one if it exists in FPT
with respect to the number p of types of agents.
Proof. We will prove that Algorithm 2 correctly decides the existence of an envy-free feasible allocation. If
Algorithm 2 returns an allocation T λ for some star-forestG, then it is not difficult to verify that the allocation
is indeed an envy-free feasible allocation. Conversely, suppose that there exists an envy-free feasible allocation
T . Obviously, T is an allocation consistent with GT , which is a star-forest by Lemma 3. Consider the size
vector λ := λT . The vector λ is valid by Lemma 4. Further, T λ is an envy-free feasible allocation by Lemma
5. Finally, Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 ensure that λ remains as a candidate vector during the execution of the
algorithm, i.e., λ ∈
∏
j∈[t] Λj , which proves the claim.
Algorithm 2: FPT w.r.t. the number of types
1 foreach star-forest graph G do
2 Let Λj =
[
|A∈Cj |
]
(j ∈ [t]);
3 while Λj 6= ∅ (∀j ∈ [t]) do
4 Let λ = (maxΛj)j∈[t];
5 if λ is not valid then
6 if λ violates (4) or (5) then
7 Let j′ ∈ [t] be an index for which λ violates (4) or (5);
8 Set Λj′ ← Λj′ − λj′ ;
9 continue;
10 else if λ violates (6) or (7) then break;
11 else // λ violates (8)
12 Let j′ ∈ [t] be an index for which λj′−1 < λj′ ;
13 Set Λj′ ← Λj′ − λj′ ;
14 continue;
15 if T λ is infeasible then
16 Let i′ ∈ [k] be the minimum index such that |Tλi′ | > qi′ ;
17 Let j′ ∈ [t] be the index such that Tλi′ ⊆ A∈Cj′ ;
18 Set Λj′ ← Λj′ − λj′ ;
19 continue;
20 if T λ is not envy-free then
21 Let i′, i′′ ∈ [k] be indices such that an agent in Ti′ envies an agent in Ti′′ ;
22 Let j′′ ∈ [t] be the index such that Ti′′ ⊆ ACj′′ ;
23 Set Λj′′ ← Λj′′ − λj′ ;
24 continue;
25 return T λ;
26 return “No envy-free feasible allocation”;
Constant number of taxis We now move on to the next question of computing an envy-free allocation
when the number of taxis is a constant. The next lemma states that, in an envy-free allocation, every agent
must be allocated to a taxi that charges the minimum cost.
Lemma 8. For any envy-free feasible allocation T , taxi i ∈ [k], and agent a ∈ Ti, we have
ϕ(Ti, xa) ≤ ϕ(Tj , xa)
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for all Tj ∈ T with i 6= j. Further, the strict inequality holds if a is not the first passenger to drop off in Tj,
i.e., xa > mina′∈Tj xa′ .
Proof. To show the first statement, suppose towards a contradiction that there exists Tj ∈ T such that
ϕ(Ti, xa) > ϕ(Tj , xa). Let a
′ ∈ Tj where xa′ ≥ xa (such agent a′ exists since otherwise ϕ(Tj , xa) =∫ xa
0
r.
nTj (r)
=∞). Then we have
ϕ(Ti, xa) > ϕ(Tj , xa) = ϕ(Tj − a
′ + a, xa),
which contradicts the fact that T is envy-free.
To show the second statement, assume towards a contradiction that there exists Tj ∈ T such that
xa > mina′∈Tj xa′ and ϕi(Ti, xa) = ϕj(Tj , xa). By our supposition, there is an agent a
′ ∈ Tj such that
xa′ < xa; choose such a
′ ∈ Tj with maximum xa′ . Then,
ϕ(Tj , xa) =
∫ xa
0
r.
nTj (r)
>
∫ xa′
0
r.
nTj (r)
+
(xa − xa′)
nTj (xa) + 1
= ϕ(Tj − a
′ + a, xa),
which implies that ϕ(Ti, xa) > ϕ(Tj − a′ + a, xa), a contradiction.
Recall that the cost of an agent a ∈ A in an allocation is determined by the agents of type smaller than
xa and the number of agents allocated to the same taxi as agent a. Formally, for coalition T ⊆ A, positive
real x ∈ R>0, and positive integer µ ∈ [n], we define
ψ(T, x, µ) :=
∫ x
0
r.
nT (r) + µ− |T |
.
For a feasible allocation T , it is not difficult to verify ϕ(T, x) = ψ(T<x, x, |T |) for each T ∈ T and x ∈ R>0.
Lemma 8 thus implies that we can uniquely determine the coalition of each agent in a greedy manner from an
agent with nearest destination, when fixing the size of each taxi and the agents who are the first passengers
in their coalitions. Building up on this observation, we can design the following greedy algorithm to compute
an envy-free allocation when the number of taxis is a constant.
Theorem 3. We can decide the existence of an envy-free allocation and find one if it exists in polynomial
time when the number k of taxis is a constant.
Proof. We say that allocation T is consistent with (µi, si, ri)i∈[k] if each taxi i ∈ [k] satisfies the following:
– the number of allocated agents equals to µi, i.e., |Ti| = µi;
– the first drop-off point equals to si, i.e., mina∈Ti xa = si; and
– the number of agents who get off at the first drop-off point equals to ri, i.e., |Ti ∩ A=si | = ri.
We call (µi, si, ri)i∈[k] a configuration.
Fix a configuration (µi, si, ri)i∈[k]. Our aim is to decide the existence of an envy-free allocation that is
consistent with the configuration. We assume that µi, ri ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, si ∈ {xa | a ∈ A}, ri ≤ µi ≤ qi for
each i ∈ [k], and
∑
i∈[k] µi = n, since otherwise no allocation is consistent with the configuration. In an envy-
free feasible allocation, if agent a is the first passenger to drop off in his coalition then all the agents of type
xa are the first passengers in their coalitions by Lemma 2. Hence, we also assume |A=si | =
∑
j∈[k]: sj=si
rj
for each i ∈ [k]. Note that, the number of such possible configurations is at most O(n3k), which is polynomial
when k is a constant.
By Lemma 8, we can efficiently compute whether there is an envy-free feasible allocation that is consistent
with (µi, si, ri)i∈[k], by allocating each agent in ascending order of destination to a taxi with the cheapest
cost and checking whether the obtained allocation is both envy-free and feasible. The formal description is
given in Algorithm 3.
In what follows, we will formally argue that Algorithm 3 correctly decides whether there is an envy-free
feasible allocation T that is consistent with (µi, si, ri)i∈[k].
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Algorithm 3: XP algorithm w.r.t. the number of taxis
1 foreach configuration (µi, si, ri)i∈[k] do
2 Initialize Ti ← ∅ for each i ∈ [k];
3 for a← 1, 2, . . . , n do
4 if xa = si for some i ∈ [k] then
5 Let i∗ ∈ [k] be an index such that si∗ = xa and |Ti∗ | < ri∗ ;
6 else Let i∗ ∈ argmini∈[k]:si<xa∧|Ti|<µi ψ(Ti, xa, µi) ;
7 Set Ti∗ ← Ti∗ + a;
8 if (T1, . . . , Tk) is envy-free then return (T1, . . . , Tk) ;
9 return “No envy-free feasible allocation”;
Suppose that Algorithm 3 returns an allocation T for (µi, si, ri)i∈[k]. It is not difficult to verify that T
is an envy-free feasible allocation, which is consistent with (µi, si, ri). Conversely, suppose that there is an
envy-free feasible allocation T that is consistent with (µi, si, ri)i∈[k]. For each agent a ∈ A with xa = si for
some i ∈ [k], Algorithm 3 allocates a to such i because |A=si | =
∑
j∈[k]: sj=si
rj . For each agent a ∈ A with
xa 6= si for any i ∈ [k], Lemma 8 implies that if a ∈ Ti,
ϕ(Ti, xa) = ψ(Ti ∩ A<xa , xa, µi) < ψ(Tj ∩A<xa , xa, µj) = ϕ(Tj , xa)
for all j 6= i with sj < xa and |Tj| < µj ; thus, i must be uniquely chosen as i∗ in Line 6. Hence, Algorithm
3 can return an allocation for (µi, si, ri).
In general, we have two difficulties to extend the greedy strategy. The first difficulty is that the num-
ber of possible combinations of taxis’ size may be exponential. The second difficulty is that we may have
exponentially many possibilities to split each destination type.
Constant capacity Finally, we consider the case when the capacity of each taxi is at most four. We will
design a greedy algorithm in a similar spirit to the one for a constant number of taxis. In outline, the
algorithm guesses the number of passengers in each taxi; the number of such candidate vectors is bounded
by polynomial since the maximum capacity of a taxi is bounded by a constant. The algorithm then decides
how to split the agents of the first drop-off points. The key property is that when the capacity of each taxi
is at most four, such splitting can be uniquely determined.
The next lemma further ensures that, if a coalition T consists of |T | − 1 agents of type x, then all the
other agents of type x form coalitions without any agent of the other type, and the first passengers of the
other coalitions of size |T | drop off at destinations smaller than x.
Lemma 9. For an envy-free feasible allocation T and T ∈ T , suppose that all agents in T except for one
drop off at the first destination, i.e., |T=x| = |T | − 1 for x = mina∈T xa. Then, for any T ′ ∈ T with T ′ 6= T
and |T ′| = |T |, the first drop-off point x′ of T ′ (x′ = mina∈T ′ xa) appears strictly before x (i.e., x′ < x), or
all agents in T ′ drop off at x (i.e., T ′ ⊆ A=x).
Proof. To prove the claim, suppose that |T=x| = |T | − 1 for T ∈ T with x = mina∈T xa. Let a∗ be the
unique agent in T>x. Take any T
′ ∈ T − T with |T ′| = |T | and let x′ = mina∈T ′ xa. Assume towards
a contradiction that x′ ≥ x, and some agent in T ′ does not drop off at x, i.e., maxa∈T ′ xa > x. Let
x′′ = min{xa∗ ,maxa∈T ′ xa}. Note that x < x′′ ≤ xa∗ . Hence, a∗ envies every agent a in T ′=x′, because
ϕ(T, xa∗) =
x
|T |
+ (xa∗ − x) >
x
|T ′|
+
x′′ − x
2
+ (xa∗ − x
′′) ≥ ϕ(T ′ − a+ a∗, xa∗),
a contradiction.
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Equipped with this, we can show that an envy-free feasible allocation can be computed in polynomial
time, when the maximum capacity is at most four.
Theorem 4. If qi ≤ 4 for all i ∈ [k], then we can check the existence of an envy-free feasible allocation and
find one if it exists in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an envy-free feasible allocation and let T ∗ = (T ∗1 , . . . , T
∗
k ) be such an
allocation. Without loss of generality, we may assume that mina∈T∗
1
xa ≤ · · · ≤ mina∈T∗
k
xa and |T ∗1 | ≥
· · · ≥ |T ∗k | by the monotonicity lemma (Lemma 1). In addition, for every split type x, we may assume that
the taxis are arranged in monotone non-increasing order in terms of the number of agents of type x, i.e.,
|T ∗u ∩ A=x| ≥ |T
∗
u+1 ∩ A=x| ≥ · · · ≥ |T
∗
v ∩A=x| where {u, u+ 1, . . . , v} = {i ∈ [k] | T
∗
i ∩ A=x 6= ∅}.
We show that an allocation T = (T1, . . . , Tk) with |Ti ∩ A=x| = |T ∗i ∩ A=x| (∀i ∈ [k], x ∈ R>0) can be
found by the following procedure:
(i) guess |T ∗i | (i ∈ [k]);
(ii) greedily allocate the agent with nearest destination;
(iii) check whether the resulting allocation is envy-free.
Let M be the set of possible k-tuples (|T ∗1 |, . . . , |T
∗
k |), i.e., the set of k-tuples of integers (µ1, . . . , µk) such
that µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µk ≥ 0,
∑
i∈[k] µi = n, and µi ≤ qi (i ∈ [k]). As qi ≤ 4 for all i ∈ [k], and µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µk, we
have |M| = O(n4). Hence, we can enumerate all the possibilities in a polynomial time.
Algorithm description: Fix (µ1, . . . , µk) ∈ M, and we greedily add agents A=x with the smallest type x
to a taxi which charges the minimum cost mini ϕ(Ti, x). If there are multiple agents of type x and they are
about to be added to taxis which are allocated no agents of type smaller than x, we need to consider how
to split the agents of type x. For an allocation T , the multiset of the sizes |Ti ∩ A=x| is referred to as split
outcome in T . We will only denote nonzero sizes to represent a split outcome.
Suppose that the agents of type x are allocated to taxis which will carry µ (∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) agents (such µ
exists by Lemma 2). Then, by Lemmas 2 and 9, we can uniquely determine the split outcomes as shown in
Table 1. For example, when µ = 4 and |A=x| = 4, there are five possibilities of split outcomes:
{1, 1, 1, 1}, {1, 1, 2}, {2, 2}, {1, 3}, {4}.
However, the first three possibilities (i.e., {1, 1, 1, 1}, {1, 1, 2}, {2, 2}) violates Lemma 2 (iii) (i.e., if two taxis
have an equal number of agents of split type, then no agent of the other type ride these taxis). The fourth
possibility violates Lemma 9 (i.e., if a coalition T consists of |T | − 1 agents of type x, then all the other
agents of type x form coalitions without any agent of the other type).
When µ = 4 and |A=x| = 4d + 3 for an integer d, we have two possible split outcomes that satisfies
necessary conditions of an envy-free allocation in Lemmas 2 and 9: {4, . . . , 4, 2, 1} and {4, . . . , 4, 3}. Note
that if |T ∗i | = 4 and |T
∗
i ∩A=x| = 3 then |T
∗
i+1| ≤ 3 by Lemma 9. Hence, the latter split outcome is possible
only when there are exactly d + 1 empty taxis carrying 4 agents. In contrast, the former split outcome is
possible only when there are at least d + 2 empty taxis which will carry 4 agents. Thus, we can uniquely
determine which split outcome can be used. The formal description of the algorithm is given by Algorithm 4.
Correctness: Now, we formally show that Algorithm 4 returns an envy-free feasible allocation in polyno-
mial time if there exists such an allocation. Since |M| = O(n4), the algorithm runs in O(n4 · n2) = O(n6)
time. It is not difficult see that Algorithm 4 returns an envy-free feasible allocation if it returns an allo-
cation. Suppose that there exists an envy-free feasible allocation T ∗ and let µ∗i = |T
∗
i | for all i ∈ [k]. We
prove the claim by showing that the algorithm computes an allocation T such that T = (T1, . . . , Tk) with
Ti ≃ T
∗
i (∀i ∈ [k]) in the for-loop when (µ1, . . . , µk) = (µ
∗
1, . . . , µ
∗
k). The proof is by an induction on type
x. For each type x whose agents are not the first passengers to drop off in their coalition of T ∗, Lemma 8
implies that if a ∈ Ti ∩ A=x,
ϕ(Ti, x) = ψ(Ti ∩A<x, x, µ
∗
i ) = ψ(T
∗
i ∩ A<x, x, µ
∗
i ) < ψ(T
∗
j ∩ A<x, x, µ
∗
j ) = ψ(Tj ∩ A<x, x, µ
∗
j ) = ϕ(Tj , x)
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for all j 6= i with |Tj | < µ∗j ; thus, i must be uniquely chosen as i
∗ in Line 4. For each type x of which agents
are the first passengers to drop off in their coalition of T ∗, the algorithm correctly allocates the agents of
type x because the split outcome of T ∗ is determined as shown in Table 1 and the algorithm allocates the
agents in the same manner. Hence, we have |Ti ∩ A=x| = |T ∗i ∩ A=x| (∀i ∈ [k], x ∈ R>0). As T must be an
envy-free feasible allocation, Algorithm 4 returns an envy-free feasible allocation.
Table 1. Split of type x
µ |A=x| split outcome
4 4d {4, 4, . . . , 4}
4 4d + 1 {4, 4, . . . , 4, 1}
4 4d + 2 {4, 4, . . . , 4, 2}
4 4d + 3 {4, 4, . . . , 4, 2, 1} (if d+ 2 taxis are available)
{4, 4, . . . , 4, 3} (otherwise)
3 3d {3, 3, . . . , 3}
3 3d + 1 {3, 3, . . . , 3, 1}
3 3d + 2 {3, 3, . . . , 3, 2}
2 2d {2, 2, . . . , 2}
2 2d + 1 {2, 2, . . . , 2, 1}
1 d {1, 1, . . . , 1}
Algorithm 4: Polynomial-time algorithm for qi ≤ 4 (∀i ∈ [k])
1 foreach (µ1, . . . , µk) ∈ M do
2 Let Ti ← ∅ for each i ∈ [k];
3 for a← 1, 2, . . . , n do // from nearest to farthest
4 Let i∗ be the minimum index that minimizes ψ(Ti, xa, µi) while satisfying |Ti| < qi;
5 if |Ti∗ | = 2, xa−2 = xa−1 = xa < xa+1, and µi∗ = µi∗+1 = 4 then
6 Set Ti∗+1 ← Ti∗+1 + a;
7 else Set Ti∗ ← Ti∗ + a;
8 if (T1, . . . , Tk) is feasible and envy-free then return (T1, . . . , Tk);
9 return “No envy-free feasible allocation”;
The above result may not be directly extended to the case of qi = 5 for some i. This is essentially because
the splitting of agents of the same type cannot be uniquely determined: we have two possibilities as to
whether a type with 5 agents is allocated into one taxi or two taxis (one for 2 and one for 3).
5.2 Consecutive envy-free allocation
One desirable property that the allocation returned by the backward greedy satisfies is consecutiveness,
i.e., agents form consecutive groups according to their destinations. The property is intuitive to the users
and hence important in practical implementation. Formally, an allocation T is consecutive if maxa∈T xa ≤
mina∈T ′ xa or mina∈T xa ≥ maxa∈T ′ xa hold for all distinct T, T ′ ∈ T . However, there is an instance such
that any envy-free feasible allocation is not consecutive; see Example 10 in the appendix.
Example 10. Consider an instance where n = 10, k = 2, q1 = 6, q2 = 4, x1 = · · · = x4 = 1, x5 = · · · = x8 =
10, and x9 = x10 = 20. Then, it can be easily checked that allocation T ∗ = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10}, {5, 6, 7, 8}) is
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envy-free but not consecutive (see Fig. 10). Moreover, this allocation is the unique envy-free allocation for
the instance. To see this, consider any envy-free feasible allocation T = (T1, T2). By feasibility, |T1| = 6 and
|T2| = 4. Agents of type x = 1 must be allocated to T1 since the cost they have to pay in T1 is
1
6 and that
for T2 is
1
4 . Hence, {1, 2, 3, 4} ⊆ T1. Further, all agents of type x = 10 must be allocated to T2: if some agent
of type x = 10 is allocated to T1, then he would envy an agent of the same type allocated to T2 since the
cost he has to pay at T1 is
1
6 +
9
2 , which is strictly greater than the cost of
10
4 at T2. Thus, all agents of
type x = 20 must be allocated to T1 and hence T = T ∗. This, in turn, implies that no envy-free feasible
allocation is consecutive.
T1
T2
1,2,3,4
1
5,6,7,8
10
9,10
20
Fig. 10. An allocation that is envy-free but not consecutive
We will show that the existence of a consecutive envy-free allocation can be efficiently checked in poly-
nomial time. By the monotonicity lemma and the assumption that q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qk, it is sufficient to consider
allocations T that satisfy

|T1| ≥ |T2| ≥ · · · ≥ |Tk|,∑
i∈[k] |Ti| = n,
|Ti| ≤ qi (∀i ∈ [k]),
Ti = {si, si + 1, . . . , ti} (∀i ∈ [k]),
si =
∑i−1
i′=1 |Ti′ |+ 1 and ti = si + |Ti| − 1 (∀i ∈ [k]).
(10)
The next lemma states that we can check the envy-freeness of a consecutive allocation by only checking
envies between adjacent boundary agents.
Lemma 10. A consecutive allocation T of the form (10) is envy-free if and only if for every i ∈ [k′ − 1], ti
and si+1 do not envy each other.
Proof. Since the “only if” part is clear, we prove the “if” part. Suppose that there is no pair of agents ti
and si+1 with i ∈ [k′− 1] such that at least one agent envies the other. To obtain a contradiction, let ai ∈ Ti
and aj ∈ Tj be a pair such that ai envies aj . We pick such a pair with ai as small as possible. We separately
consider two cases: (i) i < j and (ii) i > j.
Case (i): i < j. As ai envies aj , we have∫ xai
0
r.
nTi(r)
= ϕ(Ti, xai) > ϕ(Tj − aj + ai, xai) =
xai
|Tj|
≥
xai
|Ti+1|
.
Note that 1
x
∫ x
0
r.
nTi (r)
is monotone non-decreasing in x, since nTi(r) is monotone non-increasing in r. Hence,
we have
1
xti
∫ xti
0
r.
nTi(r)
≥
1
xai
∫ xai
0
r.
nTi(r)
>
1
|Ti+1|
.
Thus, we obtain
ϕ(Ti, xti) =
∫ xti
0
r.
nTi(r)
>
xti
|Ti+1|
= ϕ(Ti+1 − si+1 + ti, xti),
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meaning that ti envies si+1, a contradiction.
Case (ii): i > j. As ai envies aj , we have
ϕ(Ti, xai) > ϕ(Tj − aj + ai, xai) = ϕ(Tj − aj + ti−1, xti−1) + (xai − xti−1)
≥ ϕ(Ti−1, xti−1) + (xai − xti−1)
= ϕ(Ti−1 − ti−1 + ai, xti−1) + (xai − xti−1)
= ϕ(Ti−1 − ti−1 + ai, xai),
where the second inequality holds since ti−1 does not envy aj by the minimality of ai. Hence, we have
ϕ(Ti, xsi) = ϕ(Ti, xai)−
∫ ai
xsi
r.
nTi(r)
> ϕ(Ti−1 − ti−1 + ai, xai)−
∫ ai
xsi
r.
nTi(r)
≥ ϕ(Ti−1 − ti−1 + ai, xai)− (ai − xsi ) = ϕ(Ti−1 − ti−1 + si, xsi),
meaning that si envies ti−1, a contradiction.
The above lemma enables us to design a dynamic programming to check the existence of an envy-free
feasible allocation that is also consecutive.
Theorem 5. we can check the existence of an envy-free feasible allocation that is consecutive, and find one
if it exists in polynomial time.
Proof. Let us consider the subproblem in which [n′] is the set of agents and [k′] is the set of taxis. Let
z(n′, k′, ℓ) ∈ {0, 1} be 1 if and only if there exists a consecutive envy-free allocation T with |Tk′ | = ℓ in the
subproblem. When there is only one taxi (i.e., k′ = 1), it is not difficult to see that
z(n′, 1, ℓ) =
{
1 if n′ = ℓ and n′ ≤ q1,
0 otherwise.
Moreover, for k′ > 1, we have z(n′, k′, ℓ) = 1 if and only if there exists ℓ′ ∈ [min{ℓ, qk′−1}] such that
– z(n′ − ℓ, k′ − 1, ℓ′) = 1,
– ϕ(T, xn′−ℓ) ≤ ϕ(T ′ \ {n′ − ℓ+ 1} ∪ {n′ − ℓ}, xn′−ℓ), and
– ϕ(T ′, xn′−ℓ+1) ≤ ϕ(T
′ \ {n′ − ℓ} ∪ {n′ − ℓ+ 1}, xn′−ℓ+1),
where T = {n′−ℓ−ℓ′+1, . . . , n′−ℓ} and T ′ = {n′−ℓ+1, . . . , n′}. Lemma 1 and Lemma 10 immediately imply
that a consecutive envy-free allocation in the original instance exists if and only if maxℓ∈[n] z(n, k, ℓ) = 1.
If this is the case, such a feasible partition can be found using standard dynamic programming techniques.
The bound on the running time is O(n3k), which is polynomial in the input size.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new model of the fair ride allocation problem on a line with an initial point.
We proved that the backward greedy allocation satisfies Nash stability, strongly swap-stability, and social
optimality. In addition, we showed that envy-free allocations may not exist and designed several algorithms
to decide the existence of an envy-free feasible allocation and find one if it exists. The obvious open problem is
the complexity of finding an envy-free allocation for the general case. There are several possible extensions of
our model. First, while we have assumed that agents ride at the same starting point, it would be very natural
to consider a setting where the riding locations may be different. Extending our results to this setting would
be a promising research direction. Besides the Shapley value, there are other division rules of cooperative
games that can be applied to our model. Examples include the Owen value and the Banzhaf value. It would
be interesting to see whether using a different rule of cooperative games results in a different property of an
allocation.
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